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I. INTRODUCTION
“The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a
public good of transcendent importance.”1 As Justice Stevens eloquently
wrote in the majority opinion of Jaffee v. Redmond,2 mental health should be
more than a mere afterthought when considering the health and well-being
of society. Mental and physical health intertwine in equal parts to form the
overall well-being of a person; therefore, the two should be considered of
equal importance.3 Unfortunately, historically speaking, the general
population has all too often failed to recognize the importance of mental
health. This societal reluctance is still evident in professional circles today,
particularly in the legal community.
Lawyers occupy one of the most stressful and confrontational
professional occupations. Unlike other professions such as medicine,
accounting, or engineering, where collaboration is essential to a successful
result for all affected parties, the adversarial common law system pits lawyers
against each other.4 In this zero-sum system, parties commit to zealously
opposing equally qualified and trained colleagues.5 Some commentators
1. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).
2. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
3. See id. at 11 (justifying the extension of psychotherapist-patient privilege through emphasis
on its positive effects in providing for mental and emotional benefits to the general population).
4. See ALEX WILSON ALBRIGHT & DUSTIN B. BENHAM, TEXAS COURTS: A SURVEY 2 (2018)
(outlining the partisan and competitive nature of the American judicial system which seeks not so much
the truth, but rather success through effective advocacy on the part of participating lawyers).
5. Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33, 47–48 (2001)
(describing the American adversarial legal system as a zero-sum game where there must be winners and
losers between competing litigants).
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traced the historical roots of the modern American legal system to the old
English tradition of “trial by battle,” with lawyers representing litigants and
serving as proverbial gladiators in the modern ring of the American
courtroom.6 The constant strain placed upon lawyers in this professional
environment commonly leads to mental fatigue and mental illness. As
studies reveal, lawyers are among the most susceptible in America to mental
health issues.7
Despite recent progress in addressing lawyers’ mental health, there
remains an inherent tension between the legal profession’s concern with the
mental health of practicing lawyers and a lawyer’s duty to advocate
effectively on behalf of clients. This tension is most prevalent in a lawyer’s
duty to forgo or withdraw from representing clients where “the lawyer’s
physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to
represent the client,” as set forth in Rule 1.16(a)(2) of the American Bar
Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct.8
This Comment spurs critical discussion and consideration of the need to
take progressive steps in combatting instances of mental illness in the legal
profession through changing the way state disciplinary actions treat mental
health. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct serve as the basis
of this Comment’s analysis of how mental health conditions trigger
professional duties for lawyers during client representation.9 Without
question, many lawyers experience serious substance abuse and addictive
dependence, but this Comment will focus on other equally serious mental
health conditions that, to date, have not received as much attention in
academic discourse. Lawyers are increasingly recognized as struggling with

6. See Jim Wilets & Areto A. Imoukhuede, A Critique of the Uniquely Adversarial Nature of the U.S.
Legal, Economic and Political System and Its Implications for Reinforcing Existing Power Hierarchies, 20 U. PA. J.L.
& SOC. CHANGE 341, 345 (2018) (drawing comparisons between the modern adversarial legal system
and the feudal British legal system, “which incorporated a literal ‘trial by battle’ in its earliest genesis”).
7. See Sarah Cearley, Lawyer Assistance Programs: Bridging the Gap, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 453, 456 (2014) (lamenting the professional environment of the adversarial legal profession which
contributes to substantial physiological strains on attorneys’ mental health).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
9. See id. (detailing the mandatory duty to withdraw or forgo representation where a lawyer has
a physical or mental health condition materially impairing her ability to represent her client).
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general anxiety,10 major depression,11 and bipolar disorder.12 With
increased awareness and sensitivity to the severe effects of mental health
disorders, the implications of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) are liable to have an
increased impact on the legal profession as lawyers who become aware of
their mental health problems must cope with professional responsibilities
owed to clients.13
Some may argue state bar associations are well within their discretion to
decide it is in the best interest of the profession to protect clients by
imposing additional responsibilities on lawyers with mental health
conditions such as depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. Indeed, they
may rely on the long-held aphorism maintaining the practice of law is not a
right but a privilege that rests within the province of the several states to
regulate and control.14 However, in times gone by, leaders in the legal
profession used these individualistic notions to justify preventing certain
groups of people from entering the legal profession altogether.15
The fact that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain provisions
for disciplining attorneys with mental conditions due to the presence of the
condition, under certain circumstances, might dissuade attorneys with
mental health conditions from continuing practice.16 Thus, this Comment
argues taking disciplinary action against lawyers with mental health
10. See generally NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
GENERALIZED ANXIETY DISORDER: WHEN WORRY GETS OUT OF CONTROL (2016) [hereinafter
NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, WHEN WORRY GETS OUT OF CONTROL] (describing the signs,
symptoms, and treatment of generalized anxiety disorder).
11. See generally NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DEPRESSION: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW (2015) [hereinafter NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH,
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW] (explaining the signs, symptoms, and treatment of depression).
12. See generally NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
BIPOLAR DISORDER (2018) [hereinafter NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, BIPOLAR DISORDER]
(informing the public of the signs symptoms, and treatment of bipolar disorder).
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (maintaining lawyers must seek to
withdraw from representation when they know of a mental health impairment that would materially
impair their representing a client’s interests).
14. In re Lee, 806 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Ark. 1991) (“The practice of law is a privilege, not a matter
of right.”).
15. Cf. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 137, 139 (1872) (holding the right to practice law was
not a privilege within the meaning of the United States Constitution, therefore permitting states to
withhold law licenses from women).
16. See In re Evans, 169 P.3d 1083, 1090 (Kan. 2007) (reaffirming the notion that a lawyer who
engages in professional misconduct is subject to appropriate discipline); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (providing lawyers with mental conditions are subject to discipline when the
presence of their mental condition materially impairs their ability to represent their client).
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conditions is not the best system to address incidents of lawyer mental
health conditions if the profession is serious in its desire to combat these
problems. The inherent tension between an increased desire for lawyers to
receive treatment for their mental health conditions and the possible
sanctions imposed on lawyers practicing with these conditions is an idea ripe
for reconsideration.
Part II of this Comment will examine the historical development of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, emphasizing their relation to mental
health. Then it will shift into a discussion of the current trends in mental
health within the legal community; a recent landmark study conducted
among state Lawyer Assistance Programs will serve as a useful guide in this
endeavor. Part III will examine applicational problems in how Model
Rule 1.16(a)(2) affects relevant groups of lawyers. Part IV will offer possible
revisions of the Model Rules to protect clients and the legal profession.
This Comment concludes by acknowledging the great strides the legal
profession has made in supporting lawyers with mental health conditions
but will remain steadfast in emphasizing the need for even more support.
Hopefully, this Comment prompts increased sensitivity in dealing with
lawyers with mental health conditions.
II. BACKGROUND
Conceptualizing mental health disorders is undoubtedly difficult for
those without firsthand experience of the emotional and physical symptoms
of conditions like anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder. People
unfamiliar with these mental health conditions may take the stereotypical
symptoms associated with a depressive or anxiety disorder and attempt to
rationalize the emotional aspects of these experiences. It is not controversial
to state nervousness and sadness—two key symptoms associated with these
mental health conditions—are a normal part of life for most people.
However, as medical research continues to improve, studies have discovered
a wide range of psychological and psychosomatic symptoms attributable to
depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder that might surprise those
unimpaired by the daily added difficulties these symptoms and conditions
impose on those suffering from these conditions.17

17. Office of Law. Regulation v. Cotten (In re Cotten), 650 N.W.2d 551, 552–53 (Wis. 2002)
(disciplining an attorney suffering from depression who, due to her condition, was prevented from
answering phone calls, opening mail, and attending court hearings).
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The symptoms of depression are characterized as persistent sadness,
anxiety, or “empty mood”; constant feelings of hopelessness or pessimism;
lingering feelings of guilt, worthlessness, or helplessness; loss of pleasure or
interest in activities and hobbies; decreased energy, fatigue, or being “slowed
down”; difficulty remembering, concentrating, or decision-making; changes
in appetite and/or weight; thoughts of death, suicide, or suicide attempts;
and restlessness or irritability.18 Those suffering from anxiety disorder may
experience excessive worry about daily activities, trouble controlling feelings
of worry or nervousness, constant restlessness, difficulty concentrating,
being easily startled, insomnia, stomachache or other pains, trembling,
twitching, difficulty swallowing, profuse sweating, light-headedness, and/or
breathlessness.19 Bipolar disorder—formerly known as manic depressive
disorder—causes an afflicted person to suffer periodic episodes of
contrasting, extreme symptoms.20 The symptoms involved can be either
manic or depressive, such as, respectively: elation and sadness, excitement
and restlessness, hyperactive thoughts and inability to concentrate or make
decisions, increased interest in pleasurable activities and a lack of interest in
nearly all experiences.21
A. Mental Health in the Legal Profession
Stress, a nearly ubiquitous concept in modern life, is one of the most
common potential instigating factors in developing these mental
disorders.22 In fact, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) found
a common form of stress involves the stress experienced at work.23 A
typical perception of those in the legal profession, and attorneys, specifically,
casts them as among the most stressed, overworked, and mentally strained
professionals. These perceptions of the legal field validate the NIMH’s
proposition when examining the sober realities of attorney mental health in
the United States. As mental health became a topic of greater significance
towards the turn of the twentieth century, empirical studies of the rates of
18. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW, supra note 11.
19. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, WHEN WORRY GETS OUT OF CONTROL, supra
note 10.
20. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, BIPOLAR DISORDER, supra note 12.
21. Id.
22. See NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
5 THINGS YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT STRESS (2019) (finding “[o]ver time, continued strain on your
body from routine stress may contribute to serious health problems, such as heart disease, high blood
pressure, diabetes, and other illnesses, as well as mental disorders like depression or anxiety”).
23. Id.

114

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 11:108

depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, and other stress-related mental
conditions among lawyers became an area of focus in the mid- to late1990s.24
G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Elaine J. Darling, and Bruce Sales conducted
one of these studies, using a sample of Washington lawyers during this time
period. The results of this study notably revealed higher rates of depression
among lawyers compared to rates of depression present in the general
population of Western industrialized countries.25 The surveyed lawyers
reported suffering depression at a rate of 19%, easily surpassing the average
rate of depression in the Western world, which ranged between 3% and
9%.26
Despite the serious findings implicit in these figures, a notable lull in the
scientific study of the legal community’s mental health occurred in the
decades following this study. In 2015, however, the Hazelden Betty Ford
Foundation, in conjunction with the American Bar Association Commission
on Lawyer Assistance Programs, completed the most comprehensive study
to date regarding the state of mental health among legal professionals.27
Researchers gathered survey responses from fifteen state bar associations
and the two largest counties of another state, resulting in a sample size of
12,825 licensed, employed lawyers.28
The Ford survey results reaffirmed the significant mental health struggles
legal practitioners face. Tested and measured using the Depression Anxiety
Stress Scales-21 self-report system, 28.3% of surveyed lawyers reported
experiencing mild to extremely severe depression, 19.2% had experienced
24. See generally Connie J.A. Beck et al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Problems and Other
Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 1 (1995) (“[I]ncrease in
employee assistance programs and professional associations that are now actively addressing
psychological distress and providing confidential counselling and alcohol treatment for their members
is a testament to the rising concern about these issues.”); G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Prevalence
of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
233, 233 (1990) (“In recent years, the American Bar Association has begun to address the problems
created by physical and psychological impairment of practicing lawyers.”); William W. Eaton et al.,
Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive Disorder, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1079, 1079 (1990)
(describing a study from 1990 analyzing rates of depression across various occupations, with lawyers
showing a significant elevation in depression rates).
25. Benjamin et al., supra note 24, at 240–41.
26. Id.
27. See Patrick R. Krill et al., The Prevalence of Substance Use and Other Mental Health Concerns Among
American Attorneys, 10 J. ADDICTION MED. 46, 46 (2016) (indicating researchers conducted the study
in order to increase the amount of data in the area of mental health in the legal community).
28. Id. at 47.
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mild to severe anxiety, and 22.7% had experienced mild to severe levels of
stress; bipolar disorder was not a measured outcome on this exam.29 The
survey revealed a piece of data perhaps even more striking when it directly
questioned respondents about their personal mental health struggles
throughout their legal careers. Of the lawyers surveyed, 61.1% indicated
they had dealt with anxiety, 45.7% indicated they had experienced
depression, and 2.4% indicated they had dealt with bipolar disorder at some
point during their career.30
The dearth of scientific studies in the early- to mid-1990s was confronted
by state bar associations’ effort to track statistics of lawyer mental health
conditions in the landmark 2015 Ford survey.31 Additionally, Lawyer
Assistance Programs have significantly expanded since the 1960s. Now
these programs help lawyers with various issues, including substance abuse,
addiction, mental health, mental illness, marriage, and finances.32 Their
mission to aid lawyers in practicing law has expanded into the realm of
mental health so as to combat instances of mental health conditions like
depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder in the legal profession.
To this end, in coordination with Lawyer Assistance Programs, the ABA
has taken the initiative to ensure legal professionals gain access to available
resources by forming the Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs to
examine the effectiveness and functioning of these programs.33 What
started as irregular collections of information has, as of 2010, turned into a
biannual survey conducted by the ABA with the willing participation of the
various state Lawyer Assistance Programs.34 In 2012, Lawyer Assistance
Programs reported opening files related to mental health impairments at the
following rates: 41% depression, 23% anxiety, and 6% bipolar disorder.35
These figures demonstrate many lawyers who request assistance from
Lawyer Assistance Programs are seeking to address these mental health
conditions.
This tacit acknowledgement proves significant when
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 50.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
Cearley, supra note 7, at 453.
ABA COMM’N ON LAW. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, 2010 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF
LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 5 (2011).
34. Id.; see Terry L. Harrell, Foreword to ABA COMM’N ON LAW. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, 2014
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (2015) (indicating the ABA
conducted the survey in 2010, 2012, and 2014).
35. ABA COMM’N ON LAW. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, 2012 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF
LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 20–21 (2013).
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considering disciplining these lawyers for practicing with these mental health
conditions.36
Comparing the results of these recent studies further demonstrates the
steadily increasing plight of lawyers with mental health issues. From 2012
to 2014, survey reports of files opened for anxiety and bipolar disorder
remained relatively constant at 21% for anxiety and 4% for bipolar disorder
in 2014, and 23% for anxiety and 6% for bipolar disorder in 2012.37
However, figures regarding depression notably surged from 2012 to 2014,
with cases increasing from 41% to 50%.38 The foregoing discussion reveals
the notable impact mental health issues pose on the legal profession, an
increased awareness within the profession, and steps the profession has
taken to understand what the increase in mental health issues among
practicing lawyers means for the profession as a whole.
As awareness and understanding of lawyers’ mental health issues has
increased, so too has the desire to connect afflicted lawyers with the vast
array of resources Lawyer Assistance Programs have developed in recent
decades.39 The homepage of the website for Lawyer Assistance Programs
emphasizes available avenues for struggling lawyers to seek help.40 Also, at
least one jurisdiction has an independent trust set up for lawyers, judges, and
law students to finance mental health treatment of all sorts.41 To this end,
overriding policy considerations often make information shared in these

36. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (indicating, to
violate the Rule, a lawyer must knowingly represent a client while afflicted with a mental condition
rendering the lawyer materially incapable of representing the client’s interests).
37. 2014 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 34, at 23;
2012 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 35, at 21.
38. Compare 2014 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra
note 34, at 23 (examining figures from Lawyer Assistance Programs for the 2014 reporting cycle) with
2012 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 35, at 21
(considering figures from Lawyer Assistance Programs for the 2012 reporting cycle).
39. See generally Ann D. Foster, Assisting the Depressed Lawyer, 70 TEX. BAR J. 221, 223 (2007)
(explaining the Texas Lawyers’ Assistance Program can assist lawyers who are suffering from mental
health afflictions).
40. See TEX LAWS.’ ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, https://www.tlaphelps.org/ [https://perma.
cc/NKW5-42AE] (listing ways through which the Texas Lawyers’ Assistance Program tries to help
attorneys with mental health struggles).
41. See What We Do, THE SHEERAN-CROWLEY TR., https://www.sheerancrowley.org/whatwe-do [https://perma.cc/GV9G-N9AG] (explaining how the Sheeran-Crowley trust funds various
forms of mental treatment for law students, lawyers, and judges).
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programs confidential.42 This ostensibly signals a preference toward
treatment rather than reporting and assessing punishment.
Apart from servicing lawyers with mental illnesses, state Lawyer
Assistance Programs have also increased attempts to dispel the myths and
stigma surrounding mental health in the legal profession.43 The preceding
testimony shows the newfound dedication state bars are devoting to lawyers
facing mental health conditions like anxiety, depression, and bipolar
disorder.
As new generations of lawyers come of age in an era where mental health
is less stigmatized, the need to discuss these issues is more acute given the
higher rate young and inexperienced lawyers suffer from mental health
conditions.44 Acceptance of the legitimacy of mental health conditions
needs to keep pace with—or perhaps outrun—the increased rates of
affliction in the legal profession. Recognizing the ubiquity of mental health
issues as a natural, controllable, and treatable characteristic inherent to the
legal practice will hopefully increase focus on mental health in the legal
profession going forward.
B. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Rule 1.16(a)(2)
Notwithstanding the great strides institutional concern has taken for
lawyers’ mental health in the past few decades, inherent tension still exists
between efforts to reduce the prevalence of mental health conditions among
practicing lawyers and concerns regarding upholding the professional
identity of the legal field. The intersection between lawyer mental health
and regulation of the legal profession is most prevalent in the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, Model Rule 1.16(a)(2)—the
mandatory withdrawal and refusal provision—implicates lawyers who
knowingly practice while suffering from mental health conditions that

42. Fred C. Zacharias, A Word of Caution for Lawyer Assistance Programming, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 237, 237 (2004); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020)
(relieving the duty for a lawyer to report knowledge of professional misconduct gained in the course
of participating in a lawyer assistance program).
43. See generally Foster, supra note 39, at 222 (providing examples of common myths about
depression as well as actual facts).
44. Cf. Krill et al., supra note 27, at 51 (“Furthermore, these mental health concerns manifested
on a similar trajectory to alcohol use disorders, in that they generally decreased as both age and years
in the field increased.”).
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materially impair their ability to represent clients.45
The ABA originally composed the Model Rules to serve as the definitive
guide influencing professional conduct development for the bench and bar
of lawyers throughout the United States.46 As principles of federalism
meant the several states retained regulation of their state bars,47 this idea of
providing a sense of uniformity in the area of ethics might have seemed to
some a tall task. The ABA proved successful to a degree; the current form
of the Model Rules represents a culmination of the ABA’s efforts over the
last century in the study, debate, and formation of these standards.48
The 1908 Canons of Ethics represented the ABA’s first attempt at
establishing a standard operating procedure relating to American lawyers’
professional conduct.49 The 1887 Code of Legal Ethics of the Alabama
State Bar Association inspired the 1908 Canons, which itself sparked the
creation and adoption of similar ethical codes among at least ten other state
bar associations.50 With no major substantive changes, the ABA adopted
the Alabama Code’s substance into canonical form with adjoining state

45. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (providing the need to withdraw from
representation where a lawyer knows they have a mental health condition that would materially impair
the representation of the client).
46. See Chair’s Introduction, A.B.A. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_pr
ofessional_conduct_preface/chair_introduction/ [https://perma.cc/BNJ8-5FKB] (proclaiming
“[t]he Model Rules of Professional Conduct are intended to serve as a national framework for
implementation of standards of professional conduct” while acknowledging the large number of
individuals from various states who comprise the legal profession).
47. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving all powers not delegated to the federal government to
the states).
48. In a historical tracing of contemporary American legal professional standards, Alabama Law
School Professional Responsibility professor, Carol Rice Andrews, explores the founding of the
modern Rules of Professional Conduct from its foundation in western Europe, comprised of primarily
English law traditions in the pre-nineteenth century, to the evolution of standard conceptions of
professionalism among lawyers in Victorian England. Andrews then ties these English professional
standards to the development of legal ethics and professionalism in the post-revolutionary United
States and through the contemporary era. See generally Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for
Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1392, 1397, 1413–14, 1434–39 (2004) (describing
the historical development of English and American legal professional standards).
49. Id. at 1439; see also CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908) (“The
future of the republic, to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of justice pure and unsullied.
It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession are
such as to merit the approval of all just men.”).
50. See Andrews, supra note 48, at 1439 (explaining the 1908 Canons were largely modelled after
the 1887 Alabama State Bar Association Code of Legal Ethics with some amendments and additions
aimed at converting the code to a national standard).
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decisions and commentary addressing each of the various rules.51 As
Professor Andrews posits, the canonization of these standards was the
initial step in forming a national conception of what professional
responsibility would mean in the American legal profession.52
For a time, the 1908 Canons remained the premier set of national
professional standards. While they were subject to periodic amendment and
revision, they substantively remained relatively consistent.53 However, in
response to constant criticism of the Canons for their largely aspirational
and broad nature, the ABA established a committee that promulgated the
1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility.54
Almost every state adopted the newly minted Model Code soon after its
promulgation.55 Accompanying this new Code were updated attitudes
regarding the need to conform to the tenants of professional conduct.56
Apart from the change in format to a three-part style containing the Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and the Disciplinary Rules, the 1969 Model Code
differed from the 1908 Canons by placing a newfound emphasis on
punishing lawyers with disciplinary action for violations of the mandatory
minimum requirements of lawyer professional conduct.57 The ABA never
attained the national uniformity the association strove for under this
promulgation of rules of professional conduct; states adopted annual
amendments the ABA proposed at a less consistent rate than amendments
to the 1908 Code.58

51. Id. at 1440–41.
52. See id. at 1442 (“The ABA also did more, moving the standards forward. The ABA critiqued
the standards, updated them to some degree, and, more importantly, nationalized them. This
widespread publication and application led to further debate and development of the standards.”).
53. See id. at 1442–43 (indicating the 1908 Canons remained relevant and without substantial
revision until 1964).
54. Id. at 1442–44, 1443 n.440 (recalling the influence of ABA President-elect, and later U.S.
Supreme Court Justice, Lewis Powell in studying the “adequacy and effectiveness” of the then-current
version of the ABA Canons).
55. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 56 (1986) (highlighting the speed
with which the majority of states adopted the 1969 Code).
56. See id. (“When the Code was adopted in 1969, the ABA appointed a special adoption
committee and launched a highly organized campaign to persuade the states to adopt the Code . . . .”).
57. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. Preliminary Statement (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (stating
the Disciplinary Rules are mandatory in nature and serve as the baseline standard for lawyer conduct,
with any lawyer acting beneath those standards being subject to disciplinary action).
58. See Andrews, supra note 48, at 1446 (indicating states’ failure to adopt amendments to the
Model Code resulted in a lack of national uniformity and stability of the Code).
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In its continuing drive for national uniformity in the professional conduct
of American lawyers, the ABA proposed the now-ubiquitous Model Rules
of Professional Conduct in 1983—less than two decades after the adoption
of the Model Code.59 In this version, the ABA eschewed the canonical
format in favor of a “restatement format,” wherein the Rules provided
accompanying commentary explaining and illustrating the application of
each rule.60 State bar associations generally accepted the new version of the
Rules, with the majority of states assenting by the year 2000.61
The ABA subsequently elected to form yet another committee to review
the standards of professional conduct—this time set forth in the Model
Rules—called the Ethics 2000 Commission.62 Despite the adoption of the
Model Rules in virtually every state in the years leading up to the turn of the
century, states were adopting different versions of the Model Rules and
making alterations to suit their local conditions.63 Furthermore, changes in
the legal profession since the promulgation of the 1983 Model Rules—
particularly due to the advance of technology—forced a need to deal with
new contentions in legal practice.64 At the conclusion of a five-year process
beginning in 1997, the Ethics 2000 Commission worked through all the
Rules of Professional Conduct, recommending and making both substantive
and stylistic changes to almost every rule.65 The changes resulted in the
contemporary Model Rules of Professional Conduct in their current form.66
As previously discussed, Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) falls under the mandatory
withdrawal rule when an attorney must decline or terminate representation

59. See generally id. at 1446–52 (indicating forty-four states adopted these “Model Rules of
Professional Conduct” in some form as of 2003, though the ABA continued to adjust them as of the
time of this writing).
60. Id. at 1446–47.
61. Id. at 1448.
62. See generally Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 441, 442–43 (2002) (summarizing
the work of the Ethics 2000 Commission as it relates to amending the 1983 ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct).
63. See Robert A. Creamer, Form Over Federalism: The Case for Consistency in State Ethics Rules
Formats, 13 PROF’L LAW. 23, 23 (2002) (describing the current non-uniformity of the various state
ethics rules, with a small minority of states having completely unique professional conduct systems and
a majority of states having adopted the Model Rules but with varying degrees of compliance with ABA
recommended amendments).
64. Andrews, supra note 48, at 1448–49.
65. Love, supra note 62, at 441–42.
66. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (setting forth the
present-day Model Rules).
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of clients.67 Among the explicitly enumerated instances requiring
mandatory withdrawal, Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) mandates a lawyer withdraw
or forgo representation when a physical or mental condition materially
impairs the ability of a lawyer to represent his or her clients.68 The
substance of contemporary Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) has been present in the
national standards of professional conduct since the 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics, though its less-defined form created a duty to withdraw
for good cause if the lawyer found him or herself incapable.69 The
canonical form of what is today Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) took its more familiar
form in the 1969 Model Code Disciplinary Rule 2-110(B)(3).70
Today, every state and the District of Columbia has adopted Rule 1.16.71
Certain stylistic variations exist between Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and its
various state counterparts, as the states have continued to adapt the Rules
to their local conditions; however, there are no significant substantive
variations between Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and the various state
equivalents.72 The ABA achieved its express goal of creating national
uniformity, at least regarding the substance of Rule 1.16(a)(2). The Model
Rules serve as the base of analysis for dealing with the professional
disciplinary treatment of lawyer mental health, specifically as it relates to the
duty to withdraw, incumbent on suffering practitioners whose conditions
materially impair their ability to represent clients.73

67. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16.
68. See id. (stating, in pertinent part, “a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if . . . the lawyer’s
physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client . . . ”).
69. CANONS OF PROF’L & JUD. ETHICS Canon 44 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908) (adopting phrasing
closely resembling what is present in the contemporary Model Rule: “The right of an attorney or
counsel to withdraw from employment, once assumed, arises only from good cause . . . if the lawyer
finds himself incapable of conducting the case effectively”).
70. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. DR 2-110(B)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“A lawyer
representing a client before a tribunal . . . shall withdraw from employment, if: [h]is mental or physical
condition renders it unreasonably difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively.”).
71. See generally ABA CPR POL’Y IMPLEM. COMM., VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: RULE 1.16 DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION (2018)
(providing various states’ versions of Rule 1.16).
72. Id.
73. See Patrick E. Longan, Teaching Professionalism, 60 MERCER L. REV. 659, 679 (2008)
(discussing the teaching of professional responsibility in law school courses as being based primarily
on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
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III. ANALYSIS: DUTIES INVOKED UNDER THE MODEL RULE
Under Model Rule 1.16(a)(2), the ABA formed the duties to protect both
clients and the profession generally from lawyers practicing with mental
health conditions that materially impair their ability to represent clients.74
However, in an era where state bar associations are increasingly concerned
with providing rehabilitative aid and resources to lawyers, these duties may
inhibit lawyers from seeking the aid they may desperately need. The
construction of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2), in conjunction with the interplay of
other rules, ensures this result. Furthermore, the ABA’s lack of guidance
requires state courts to take the initiative in defining the components of the
duties invoked under Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) through case law, leading to
inconsistent results.
A. Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) in Form and in Substance
To begin, a plain reading of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) dictates two necessary
elements for a violation of this rule to occur: a lawyer must have a “mental
condition” that “materially impairs” the lawyer’s ability to provide
representation for his or her clients.75 The Iowa Supreme Court put
forward this proposition in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v.
Cunningham,76 where the court held the state disciplinary board is required
to prove, in tandem, the existence of a mental condition materially impairing
the lawyer’s representation of the client.77 A mere reference to “health
reasons” in place of the “mental condition” element proved insufficient for
the Iowa Supreme Court in Cunningham to justify a reprimand of the lawyer’s
inadequate performance under the Iowa state equivalent to Model
Rule 1.16(a)(2).78 Cunningham is further instructive in dicta where the Iowa
Supreme Court laments the dearth of case law interpreting the Rule.79 This
lack of guidance is not unique to Iowa; case law involving the state
equivalents to Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) reveals a lack of a definitive
74. See Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Scott, 579 S.E.2d 550, 559 (W. Va. 2003) (McGraw, J.,
dissenting) (maintaining the purpose of lawyer discipline is to protect the client and profession, not to
punish a lawyer for possessing a mental health condition—bipolar II disorder in the context of this
opinion).
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
76. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d 541 (Iowa 2012).
77. See id. at 548 (denoting the findings necessary to hold a lawyer violated the duty to withdraw
while having a mental condition under the state equivalent to Model Rule 1.16).
78. Id. at 548–49.
79. Id. at 548.
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proposition as to what constitutes a mental condition or material
impairment.80 Given the crucial importance of those two features and the
lack of instruction, Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) is unworkable from the start.
This Comment addresses the element of materiality only to the extent
necessary to consider in relation to mental conditions that might trigger the
Model Rules. The lack of definition of “mental condition” under Model
Rule 1.16(a)(2) indicates lawyers may risk exposing themselves to a
mandatory duty under the Rules if they even seek counsel regarding
suspected mental health conditions such as anxiety, depression, or bipolar
disorder.81 The required mental state for a violation of this Model Rule—
knowledge82—means as soon as the lawyer becomes aware of his or her
condition and feels it will materially impair representation of any client, the
lawyer is placed under the mandatory duty to withdraw.83
The pertinent comments to Model Rule 1.16 provide no guidance as to
what constitutes a mental condition triggering the duty to withdraw or
decline representation.84 At least one commentator has noted, despite the
significant role the existence of a mental condition plays in an analysis of
violations under this rule, neither the Rule itself nor the pertinent
commentary defines what constitutes a “mental condition.”85 This leaves
disciplinary authorities to their own devices when determining what qualifies
as a mental condition when a lawyer may not have considered his or her
situation a violation. Disciplinary bodies considering common mental
health disorder symptoms afflicting the legal profession would be acting well
within reason to consider anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder as
qualifying conditions.86

80. In addition to this lack of clarity in Model Rule 1.16 itself, the subsequent comments fail to
expand on, explain, or clarify the terms. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmts.
81. See Sheridan’s Case, 813 A.2d 449, 453–54 (N.H. 2002) (assuming the lawyer’s bipolar
disorder constituted a “mental disorder” for the purpose of disciplining the lawyer).
82. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (defining knowledge as “actual knowledge
of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances”).
83. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (providing the mandatory duty to withdraw
or forgo representation when a lawyer suffers from a mental condition materially impairing the ability
of the lawyer to represent clients).
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmts. 2–3.
85. See Christina M. Costa, Preparing for the Senior Tsunami: Cognitive Decline in Aging Lawyers,
28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 471, 478–79 (2015) (discussing the failure of the Rule to elaborate on the
applicability of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) in the context of what constitutes a qualifying mental condition).
86. See Fla. Bar v. Shanzer, 572 So. 2d 1382, 1383–84 (Fla. 1991) (acknowledging the mental
health problems plaguing the legal profession in a lawyer disbarment proceeding).
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Symptoms of these mental health conditions possess a similar capacity to
affect the mind of suffering lawyers. Bipolar disorder includes symptoms
such as chronic or episodic instances of extreme manic or depressive
episodes, which affect the energy, mood, focus, and concentration of an
afflicted person.87 When in a manic state, a person can feel an outsized
sense of confidence, talent, and ability, which manifests in higher-thannormal activity levels, possibly accompanied by an irritable disposition.88
However, the converse is also true; when in a depressive state, the same
person can feel unable to complete even simple tasks, and feelings of
hopelessness can border on thoughts of death or suicide.89
When considering lawyers suffering from anxiety also often cope with
stressful occupational situations, maintaining good mental health becomes
even more difficult. With pressing deadlines, high-stakes, a contentious
process, and court filing dates often present in a lawyer’s life, most lawyers
may interpret the symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder as a product of
conducting their profession.90 The National Institute of Mental Health,
however, has classified the extreme state of worry and nervousness as a
mental disease necessitating treatment. Trouble concentrating, insomnia,
chronic fatigue, irritability, and fainting spells are just a few of the physical
symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder.91 Already predisposed to
situations that lead to anxiety, lawyers are at even greater risk of experiencing
a negative impact on their performance if their simple anxiety transforms
into generalized anxiety disorder.92
Depression—the most common mental impairment lawyers’ assistance
programs report calls for services for—shares similar symptomologies with
87. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, BIPOLAR DISORDER, supra note 12.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Dan Defoe, [Lawyer] Anxiety, Self-Protective Behavior, Ethical Sinkholes, and Professional
Responsibility, PSYCHOLAWLOGY (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.psycholawlogy.com/2015/08/10/
lawyer-anxiety-self-protective-behavior-ethical-sinkholes-and-professional-responsibility/?utm_sourc
e=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Psycholawlogy+%28Psycholawlogy
%29 [https://perma.cc/CP6V-6VEK] (“Lawyers experience nervousness, tension, dread, or
apprehension because of their work or workplace environment.”).
91. See NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, WHEN WORRY GETS OUT OF CONTROL, supra
note 10 (listing various symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder).
92. See generally Bree Buchanan & Chris Ritter, Ten Tips for Lawyers Dealing with Stress, Mental
Health, and Substance Use Issues, STATE BAR OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/ (search for “Ten Tips
for Lawyers Dealing with Stress, Mental Health, and Substance Use Issues”, and click the first link)
[https://perma.cc/3DBG-YJXJ] (explaining the prevalence and potential impact of generalized anxiety
disorder).
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anxiety and bipolar disorder. Lawyers experiencing depression may
experience feelings of helplessness and worthlessness, have difficulty
concentrating, remembering, or making decisions, have a loss of energy,
insomnia, aches and pains, and may begin contemplating death or suicide.93
All these mental conditions can potentially hinder a lawyer from completing
responsibilities to his or her clients. Absent guidance from the Model Rules,
any one of these mental conditions could, on its face, satisfy the definition
of a qualifying mental condition.
Examining other Model Rules dealing with mental health yields little
assistance in understanding what specific mental conditions qualify under
Model Rule 1.16(a)(2). For instance, Model Rule 1.14—Client with
Diminished Capacity—speaks to the duties involved when a lawyer deals
with a client of diminished mental capacity.94 Unfortunately, other than a
reference to minority, Model Rule 1.14 gives no indication what a mental
impairment specifically constitutes. Thus, no analogous definition is
transferable to “mental condition” as used in Model Rule 1.16(a)(2).
Moreover, Model Rule 1.0—Terminology—fails to define mental condition
or materially impairs.95
Given the critical role the presence of a mental condition has as an
element in determining whether a violation of the duty a lawyer has under
Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) has occurred, the lack of definition or guidance leads
to unworkable results. The ABA’s Formal Ethics Opinion 03-429 briefly
mentions some mental conditions, like Tourette’s Syndrome, might appear
to impair the ability of a lawyer to represent clients but in reality do not
materially impair the lawyer-client relationship.96 Unfortunately, there is no
mention of the effects of anxiety, depression, or bipolar disorder—three of
the most common mental conditions lawyers report suffering.97
B. Interplay of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and the Other Model Rules
The interplay of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and Model Rule 8.3 further
exacerbates the tensions and desires lawyers suffering from mental health
issues like anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder experience when
contemplating whether to seek treatment or continue practicing law
93. Foster, supra note 39, at 222.
94. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (detailing the
specific duties a lawyer has when his or her client is mentally impaired).
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0.
96. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 03-429 (2003).
97. Krill et al., supra note 27, at 50.
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untreated.
Model Rule 8.3—Reporting Professional Misconduct—
obligates lawyers to file a report with the appropriate authority if they have
knowledge of any other lawyer’s violation of any Model Rule of Professional
Conduct that may raise a substantial question about the violating lawyer’s
fitness to practice law.98 The implication of this duty, taken to its furthest
reaches, might mean when lawyers know a colleague who is suffering from
anxiety, depression, or bipolar disorder, those lawyers risk violating their
duty under Model Rule 8.3 if they do not take actions against their impaired
colleague whether or not there is an actual violation of the Model Rules.99
The proposition is seemingly confirmed based on publications from a
pair of related ABA Formal Ethics Opinions. The first opinion, Formal
Ethics Opinion 03-431, speaks to the interplay of Rules 1.16(a)(2) and 8.3—
where an attorney knows another attorney has a mental condition that
materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent his or her clients.100 The
opinion states:
Although not all violations of the Model Rules are reportable events under
Rule 8.3, as they may not raise a substantial question about a lawyer’s fitness
to practice law, a lawyer’s failure to withdraw from representation while
suffering from a condition materially impairing her ability to practice, as
required by Rule 1.16(a)(2), ordinarily would raise a substantial question
requiring reporting under Rule 8.3.101

In effect, the legal profession’s self-regulatory nature serves to make lawyers
watchdogs over each other’s mental health to protect clients and the
profession.102 Lawyers unaware they are suffering from the effects of
diagnosable mental health conditions may attempt to write off their feelings
or, even worse, attempt to hide their issues from professional colleagues for
fear of the implicated duty thereby raised.
Practically, the disciplinary implications for practicing while suffering
from mental conditions such as anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3.
99. See Thomas P. Sukowicz, The Ethics of Reporting on Your Colleague—or Yourself, 26 GPSOLO 36,
38–39 (2009) (arguing since a lawyer violating Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) involves a material impairment to
the representation of a client, violation itself calls into question the fitness of the lawyer to carry out
the representation).
100. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 03-431 (2003).
101. Id.
102. See id. (stating while lawyers are not health care professionals, they still have a duty to look
out for recognizable symptoms of mental health impairment).

2020]

Comment

127

might act as a deterrent from seeking help. The ABA opinion itself admits
the difficulty of confronting the affected lawyer about the circumstances of
the condition or the effect on his or her clients, going on to say the afflicted
lawyer may deny the allegations or seek to assure themselves or others that
any problem has been resolved.103 After all, once the lawyer gains
knowledge of their mental condition or allows their symptoms to manifest
such that they force other lawyers to report them, the Model Rules may no
longer permit the afflicted lawyer to continue practicing law.104
Relatedly, ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 03-429 speaks to the obligations
of lawyers within the same firm when dealing with their mentally impaired
coworkers. This opinion admits lawyers with mental conditions impairing
their ability to represent their clients may be oblivious to or in denial of their
condition.105 Still, the opinion reaffirms “[i]impaired lawyers have the same
obligations under the Model Rules as other lawyers”; a mental impairment
does not alleviate the responsibility of a lawyer to conduct themselves in
conformity with the Model Rules.106 State supreme court decisions echo
this sentiment regarding lawyers accused of violating Model
Rule 1.16(a)(2).107
Although this logic serves to protect clients and the legal profession, it is
at odds with the desire to protect suffering lawyers’ mental health. It places
lawyers suffering from anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder on the
receiving end of possible disciplinary actions due to their struggles with
mental health. The ABA admits, however, the unpredictable nature of how
a mental condition will impair an afflicted lawyer. Lawyers’ mental health
conditions are not always so severe as to materially impair their ability to

103. Id.
104. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (indicating an
attorney who suffers from a mental condition materially impairing her ability to represent her client is
required to withdraw from representing the client); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 &
cmt. 1 (indicating a reporting attorney “shall inform the appropriate professional authority” of another
attorney’s “violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct”).
105. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 03-429 (2003).
106. Id.
107. See In re Kelly, 917 N.E.2d 658, 659 (Ind. 2009) (holding the personal conditions of lawyers
are irrelevant to the client’s entitlement to protection from lawyer misfeasance vis-à-vis professional
conduct); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kingery, 871 N.W.2d 109, 120 (Iowa 2015) (holding
as irrelevant the mental condition of a lawyer with bipolar disorder in a disciplinary action based on
her failure to withdraw under the state equivalent to Model Rule 1.16(a)(2)).
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represent their clients.108 A lawyer with a mental condition does not have
an obligation to withdraw or forgo representation when the mental
condition does not materially affect their ability to represent clients.109 The
reporting duty under Model Rule 8.3, therefore, ebbs and flows along with
the episodic nature of triggering mental health conditions like anxiety,
depression, and bipolar disorder.110
When a mental condition is not enough to materially impair the conduct
of the lawyer, the current rules effectively treat those mental conditions as a
matter of private concern.111 Only when the lawyer is materially impaired
does the lawyer violate Model Rule 1.16(a)(2). However, the lack of an
adequate definition of what constitutes a mental condition leaves state
disciplinary panels and state supreme courts in control of what constitutes
a qualifying condition.112 The inner workings of the Model Rules miss the
goal of uniformity by leaving these critical issues for the states to decide.
Concomitantly, this leaves lawyers wondering whether they are subject to
professional discipline as a result of their having mental health conditions.
Advances in medical technology unavailable at the time of the drafting of
the Model Rules have provided a deeper understanding of many medical
conditions. Particularly in the field of genetic sequencing, people can gain
increased access to information regarding their genetic predispositions.113
As genetic sequencing becomes able to detect certain mental
predispositions, courts must decide how far they will go in extending a
lawyer’s duty to include properly informing themselves of their conditions

108. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 03-429 (2003) (acknowledging the
symptoms of mental health conditions, such as anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder, fluctuate
between good and bad days when the manifestation of symptoms is impactful).
109. See Sukowicz, supra note 99, at 39 (“Sometimes a lawyer’s psychological condition or
addiction is either not serious enough for a transfer to inactive status or the attorney has begun
treatment for the condition or addiction and is recovering.”).
110. See In re Barnes, 691 N.E.2d 1225, 1226 (Ind. 1998) (disciplining a depressed lawyer for
failing to withdraw from a bankruptcy matter only once it occurred to the lawyer he could no longer
pursue the action).
111. Sukowicz, supra note 99, at 40.
112. See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Olver, 831 A.2d 66, 70 (Md. 2003) (addressing the issue of
whether Major Depression, a chronic mental illness, constituted a mental condition satisfying the
requirements of a conditional diversion agreement for attorney discipline).
113. See Sarah L. Scott, I Am Not Sick Now but I Might Be Later: Personal Genome Sequencing and
Ethical Obligations for Lawyers, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 979, 984–85 (2013) (discussing the Human
Genome Project and the increased accessibility to a person’s genetic information for purposes of
determining genetic predispositions to certain diseases).
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in the interest of protecting clients and the legal profession.114 Again, the
ABA’s lack of guidance leaves states with a vast degree of control and
produces an unworkable result for lawyers suffering from mental health
conditions and trying to maintain professional responsibility.
C. Case Law Implications on the Functioning of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2)
Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) presents problems for attorneys suffering mental
health conditions not only in its substance and form but most consequently
in its execution. The mandatory duty to withdraw from representation
under Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) also proves unworkable to protect a lawyer’s
interest in receiving treatment due to the requirement to persist in
representation if the court disapproves withdrawal.115 Even when a
mentally impaired lawyer admits to the need to comply with the withdrawal
provision, courts have the discretion to refuse the ability to withdraw. A
lawyer suffering anxiety, depression, or bipolar disorder who attempts to
comply with the Model Rules may, consequently, be unable to do so.
Overriding policy considerations grant courts this discretion, but when a
tribunal refuses to permit withdrawal, a lawyer maintains the full extent of
his or her duty to provide representation to the client.116 In the ABA’s
terms, this results in a mentally impaired lawyer with the continued duty to
represent clients and, as a potential consequence, ineffectively represented
clients and damage to the profession.117 Courts have not shied away from
exercising their authority under this provision to deny lawyers who claim
mental conditions the ability to withdraw.118 In Wenzy v. State,119 the
defendant’s lawyer made several motions to the court requesting leave to
withdraw as counsel, citing the duty to withdraw due to his mental and
114. See id. at 989–90, 992 (speaking to the duty lawyers have towards their clients under various
provisions under the Model Rules which seem to implicate a professional responsibility for the lawyer
to have themselves tested for predispositions to medical issues).
115. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“When
ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for
terminating the representation.”).
116. See Wenzy v. State, 855 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d)
(“Once his motions to withdraw were denied, Cato was under a duty to represent Wenzy to the fullest
of his ability.”) (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(c), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9)).
117. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 & cmts 2–3 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2020) (indicating protecting clients and the profession are reasons for the mandatory duty to withdraw).
118. See, e.g., Wenzy, 855 S.W.2d at 48 (describing an instance when a trial court consistently
denied an attorney’s motion to withdraw from representation).
119. Wenzy v. State, 855 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d).
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psychological conditions materially impairing his ability to represent the
client.120 The appeals court overrode the lawyer’s duty to withdraw under
the state equivalent to Model Rule 1.16(a)(2), citing the duty of a lawyer to
gain permission of the trial court prior to withdrawing as counsel.121
This means, for lawyers suffering legitimate cases of anxiety, depression,
or bipolar disorder, the duty incumbent on them to withdraw from
representation is not fully theirs. Not only must a lawyer recognize the
mental health issues he or she suffers from and its stifling effect on the
ability to practice law, but the lawyer must also hope the court grants the
motion to withdraw if the lawyer’s representation of a client involves a case
pending before a trial court. While the need to protect the profession and
clients is indeed of paramount importance, Model Rule 1.16(a)(2), to a
degree, fails to protect the professionals.
Without intending to cast an unfairly broad generalization over the
national legal profession through recent history, it is fair to say acceptance
of the legitimacy of mental health conditions is far from ubiquitous today
and was even less so historically.122 Courts have historically been relatively
harsh in their treatment of lawyers who knew of their underlying mental and
physical conditions while continuing to practice law. In Stark County Bar
Association v. Lukens,123 a lawyer suffering from a combination of diabetes
and porphyria was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.124 The
court confronted whether a lawyer who obviously knew of his physical or
emotional condition could continue to hold himself out as a competent
practitioner.125 Answering in the negative, the court stated the lawyer
should have stopped taking new cases altogether.126 Case law is fraught
with skeptical attitudes regarding the ability of lawyers possessing mental
health conditions to practice law at all; as one judge analogized, the medical
profession would never let a doctor with palsy conduct surgery.127
120. Id. at 48.
121. Id. at 49.
122. See David A. Grenardo, You Are Not Alone: What Law Schools Must Do to Help Law Students
with Mental Health and Substance Abuse Issues, 10 HOUS. L. REV. 7, 8 (2019) (discussing the struggles
President Abraham Lincoln had with depression, or melancholy as it was then known, during his stint
as a law student and lawyer).
123. Stark Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Lukens, 357 N.E.2d 1083 (Ohio 1976).
124. Id. at 1089.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See In re Sherman, 404 P.2d 978, 983 (Wash. 1965) (Rosellini, C.J., dissenting) (advocating
suspension of an attorney and drawing an analogy between a lawyer practicing with the “handicap” of
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As society has begun to recognize, understand, and accept the prevalence
of mental health conditions in the legal profession, courts have shown
increasing acknowledgment of the mental health conditions facing legal
practitioners.128 However, mere acknowledgement does not necessarily
translate to improvements in disciplinary outcomes for lawyers related to
the duties incumbent on lawyers with mental health conditions.
Not only can the courts frustrate a lawyer’s ability to withdraw under the
provisions of the Model Rules, but a lawyer must also contend with the
wishes of his or her clients in determining whether to withdraw. In People v.
Mendus,129 a Colorado lawyer suffered anxiety to the point of having a
mental breakdown while representing two clients in divorce proceedings.130
Despite the lawyer’s repeated pleas to her clients begging them to authorize
her withdrawal from the case due to her mental health problems, the clients
insisted the lawyer continue representing them.131
After failing to withdraw and suffering a mental breakdown, the lawyer
was ultimately sanctioned for her violation of the state equivalent of Model
Rule 1.16(a)(2).132 Critics may contend the lawyer had a duty to withdraw
no matter the client’s wishes. This ignores the lawyer’s frazzled mental state
and her desire to do right by her clients. In assigning a two-year suspension
for violation of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2), the court only briefly considered the
fact that the lawyer informed her clients of her condition and suggested they
retain other counsel.133
Even when lawyers attempt to comply with professional obligations, their
clients’ interests are of concern. For better or worse, lawyers rely on their

mental illness with a doctor practicing surgery while suffering from some form of palsy); Lukens,
357 N.E.2d at 1089 (questioning whether an attorney suffering from diabetes and porphyria “should
continue to hold himself out as an attorney in general practice” given the implications those conditions
had on his mental health).
128. See Fla. Bar v. Shanzer, 572 So. 2d 1382, 1383–84 (Fla. 1991) (acknowledging the
prevalence of depression and other mental health problems in many lawyers).
129. People v. Mendus, 360 P.3d 1049 (Colo. 2015).
130. See id. at 1051–52 (examining a case where a lawyer claimed her anxiety and depression
impaired her ability to represent her clients; the clients insisted she nevertheless continue to represent
them).
131. See id. (describing conversations between the lawyer and her clients which detail the
lawyer’s struggles with her work due to her mental condition).
132. Id.
133. See id. at 1051–52, 1055 (indicating the court briefly considered the lawyer’s conversations
with her clients regarding her mental condition before finding the lawyer’s actions warranted a twoyear suspension).
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reputations to attract clients.134 Clients may neither understand nor care to
understand the complexities of a mandatory duty of withdrawal; lawyers in
an already precarious mental position are thus tasked with the additional
burden of caring for client sensibilities.135 The proposition that a lawyer
would want to protect his or her reputation to prevent a loss of current and
future clientele is not so farfetched. Therefore, while no formal requirement
dictates a lawyer must comply with a client’s wishes to persist in
representation, it is an implicit requirement in the legal profession.
Recent case law demonstrates courts in disciplinary proceedings are more
willing to accept mental health conditions, like depression or anxiety,
primarily when physical conditions accompany or give rise to the mental
state. When an attorney has an underlying mental condition, courts are
much more willing to accept it when a physical condition explains
psychosomatic symptomology adversely affecting their representation of a
client.136 Despite the effects mental conditions like anxiety and depression
can have, courts in the past have expressed skepticism in taking a lawyer’s
own testimony during a disciplinary action regarding his or her mental health
status without an accompanying diagnosis.137
In Mulkey v. Meridian Oil, Inc.,138 the trial court chastised a firm that had
two lawyers working on a personal injury case who were both involved in
significant tragedies.139 Morris, the lawyer originally assigned, was in a
plane crash shortly before the suit commenced that resulted in his wife’s
death and critical injuries to himself and his children; Keirsey, assigned to
cover Morris, was experiencing severe emotional strain during the time he
represented the plaintiff.140 Citing Oklahoma’s version of Model
Rule 1.16(a)(2), the court took issue with the firm continuing to operate
134. See Zacharias, supra note 42, at 176 (exploring the significance of a lawyer’s reputation in
an effective law practice).
135. See Young Laws. Network, Should I Fire My Client?, 24 PROB. & PROP., Jul./Aug. 2010, at 8
(discussing the subtle difficulties present in terminating representation of a client).
136. See State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Southern, 15 P.3d 1, 4, 7 (Okla. 2000) (examining an
attorney with a vitamin deficiency illness that aggravated his depression).
137. See In re Winterburg, 41 P.3d 842, 846–47 (Kan. 2002) (expressing skepticism regarding the
self-diagnosis of depression even where a lawyer testified it left her in a state of near paralysis, she was
receiving treatment from a psychiatrist, and she was being prescribed medication for depression and a
hormonal imbalance).
138. Mulkey v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 257 (W.D. Okla. 1992).
139. See id. at 259 (explaining the tragic events counsel assigned to the case experienced).
140. See id. at 259–60 (downplaying the relevance of the plane crash, the court conceded it might
have given rise to emotional consequences yet still elected to sanction the lawyers after taking issue
with the dates Keirsey gave regarding his mental condition).
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while “unable to competently represent existing clients.”141 The court
sanctioned Morris and Keirsey for their deficient performances and required
them to explain to the plaintiff why they continued operating while under
their “alleged emotional difficulties.”142 The court balanced the equities
against the lawyers despite their explanations. Dismissive attitudes and lack
of empathy toward mental health conditions portend the possibility of
underlying skepticism accompanying claims of mental health conditions.
Similar trends of skepticism exist in other cases where lawyers suffering
mental health concerns had the duty to withdraw triggered; take the case of
lawyer Southern, the subject of State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v.
Southern.143 The death of an immediate family member and serious illnesses
took a toll on the lawyer’s mental health, as the court candidly admitted.144
However, the court paid attention to Southern’s vitamin B-12 deficiency to
explain his extreme depressive symptomology.145 Despite the common
effects of depression,146 the court chose to focus on Southern’s vitamin
B-12 deficiency, which aggravated the depressive symptoms.147
This analytical trend is also present in the case of In re Fitzharris,148 where
an attorney was disciplined for violating South Carolina’s equivalent of
Model Rule 1.16(a)(2).149 In laying down her definite suspension for
unduly delaying disbursement of a client’s settlement funds, the court
considered Fitzharris’s physical and mental conditions at the time of the
violation.150 The court accepted the legitimacy of lawyer Fitzharris’s
treatment for anxiety and depression when the underlying cause was a series

141. Id. at 260.
142. Id. at 262.
143. See, e.g., State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Southern, 15 P.3d 1, 2 (Okla. 2000) (providing an
underlying physical condition was solely a mitigating factor despite the lawyer’s suffering from an illness
which caused severe symptoms).
144. Id. at 7.
145. See id. (examining an attorney with a vitamin deficiency disorder that aggravated his
depression, as both disorders have similar symptoms including weakness, fatigue, and memory lapses).
146. See Alec Coppen & Christina Bolander-Gouaille, Treatment of Depression: Time to Consider
Folic Acid and Vitamin B12, 19 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 59, 60–61 (2005) (describing several studies
finding depressive patients often had low vitamin B-12 levels).
147. Southern, 15 P.3d at 7.
148. In re Fitzharris, 782 S.E.2d 596 (S.C. 2016).
149. Id. at 597.
150. Id. at 596–97 (punishing a lawyer’s mishandling of a client’s matters due to depression and
anxiety).
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of back and shoulder surgeries during which serious complications arose
and caused her depressed state.151
An underlying physical condition was also present in the case of Lawyer
Disciplinary Board v. Dues,152 where the court accepted as legitimate the
lawyer’s claims of depression.153 The court made it a point to emphasize
Dues was an upstanding member of the bar until he suffered a heart attack
requiring triple bypass surgery and a related prostate operation.154 The
court accepted these facts as an explanation for his depressed state and
ultimately reduced the recommended suspension to a public reprimand and
temporary limitation of his practice to “work as a mental hygiene
commissioner.”155 The court took as persuasive medical testimony
attributing “[his] legal deficiencies directly to the serious depression that
flowed from Mr. Dues’ physical impairments.”156
The dissenting opinion of Dues displays the lingering antipathy toward
considering the mental health conditions of lawyers in determining
discipline. Justice Benjamin acknowledges the stigmatized and difficult
nature of mental illness in American society, yet opines: “our compassion
for the person inflicted should not include condoning harm to innocent
persons arising from a failure or refusal to get appropriate help for a mental
illness, such as depression.”157 While Justice Benjamin’s motivations lie in
protecting clients from potential harm, his premise that enforcing strict
disciplinary standards is the best way to protect the public is debatable.158
Dues did seek treatment for his depression during the period of his
misconduct—in fact, his doctor indicated with proper treatment he could
work again as an attorney159—yet views like Justice Benjamin’s would seek
to foreclose this possibility.
Thus, there are a variety of judicial attitudes regarding the legitimacy of
lawyer mental health. This almost hostile environment may dissuade
151. See id. at 597 (accepting the lawyer’s Agreement for Discipline by Consent after the lawyer
acknowledged her “physical and mental health issues contributed to the problems with Client’s case”).
152. Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Dues, 624 S.E.2d 125 (W. Va. 2005).
153. See id. at 133 (finding the lawyer’s mental disability was a mitigating factor).
154. Id. at 133–34.
155. Id. at 134–35.
156. See id. at 133–34 (concluding the lawyer’s mental disability justified limiting the lawyer’s
practice rather than suspending his license).
157. Id. at 135 (Benjamin, J., dissenting).
158. See id. (emphasizing the need to “enforce appropriate consequences for acts and/or
omissions which harm . . . clients”).
159. Id. at 132–33 (majority opinion).
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lawyers from seeking treatment for their mental health conditions as they
may face discipline for their conduct. The lack of definition present in
Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) makes this morass of case law the default guide to
understanding how a court should treat a lawyer’s mental health. With
principles of stare decisis guiding judicial decision-making in the American
legal system, the analytical idiosyncrasies present in these opinions remain
entrenched in how courts deal with violations of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2).160
Thus the unworkable effects of the Model Rule are continued in virtual
perpetuity.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Mandatory Visits to Mental Health Physicians as a Condition to Practice
One possible avenue to amend the Model Rules to simultaneously
improve the functioning of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and to protect the mental
health of lawyers is to require mandatory visits with mental health
professionals as a condition of continuing to practice law. Such a plan could
be effectuated much like how some states have adopted requirements for
lawyers to maintain a certain amount of continuing legal education hours to
maintain competence under Model Rule 1.1.161 In maintaining the demand
for competency under this Rule, the ABA Model Rule commentary
encourages but does not require lawyers to “engage in continuing study and
education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to
which the lawyer is subject.”162
Absent mandatory language, failure to comply with these suggestions in
maintaining competency would not subject an attorney to disciplinary
sanction under a strict Model Rules jurisdiction.163 Some state bar
associations have independently changed their professional responsibility
rules to incorporate a mandatory obligation on actively practicing lawyers to

160. See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV.
1, 3–4 (2012) (discussing the principle of stare decisis as it relates to preserving analytical foundations
between like cases).
161. See, e.g., MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. (2020) (requiring lawyers give
competent representation as it relates to skill, aptitude, preparation, and thoroughness in conducting
the practice of law and participate in continuing legal education to maintain such knowledge and skill).
162. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
163. Cf. Longan, supra note 73, at 681 (discussing the aspirational nature of the Model Rules visà-vis pro bono service and the general lack of lawyer participation in the absence of a mandatory duty
to participate).
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attain a certain amount of education in pertinent legal and ethical fields to
remain in good standing.164 Texas, for instance, requires attorneys to
accomplish fifteen hours of continuing legal education annually, specifically
requiring twelve to come from accredited sources to maintain compliance
with State Bar Rules and remain in good standing.165
A Texas lawyer failing to comply with these continuing legal education
requirements faces the possibility of suspension from the practice of law.166
When cast in these mandatory terms, non-compliance with legal education
would leave members of the Texas State Bar unable to practice, surely
providing the ultimate incentive to comply.167 Should the ABA decide to
amend its Model Rules, this is transferable to the concern for lawyer mental
health by making lawyers receive a proscribed amount of mental health
checkups or therapy sessions every year.168
Such a requirement would serve the profession two-fold. It would
protect clients from lawyers unaware of or unwilling to deal with their
mental health conditions, and it would also force lawyers to acknowledge
the presence of any adverse mental health issues from which they are
suffering. In light of the lack of clear guidance as to what constitutes a
qualifying mental condition, this requirement would potentially save lawyers
from having to guess whether they are practicing at an impaired level and
from discipline if their conditions are treated before the “materially impairs
representation” prong of the Model Rules is triggered.
Indeed, state supreme courts have recently allowed the disciplinary option
of continued participation in mental health wellness programs to attorneys
suffering anxiety and depression. Continued participation ensures
rehabilitation and the ability of the lawyer to practice. In some
circumstances, the courts have tacitly acknowledged the benefits practicing
lawyers would gain from mental health therapy. The District of Colombia
Court of Appeals, for instance, in In re Peek,169 stayed the final two months
164. See, e.g., TEX. STATE BAR R. art. XII, § 6, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2,
subtit. G, app. A (“Every member must complete 15 hours of continuing legal education during each
compliance year as provided by this article.”).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 8.
167. Cf. Pro Bono, TEX. ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’N, https://www.texasatj.org/pro-bono
[https://perma.cc/8N8J-L9GE] (estimating the amount of pro bono hours Texas lawyers provide at
approximately 2.5 million annually).
168. Cf. Longan, supra note 73, at 681 (discussing the lack of compliance with Model Rule
provisions regarding pro bono service due to a general lack of enforcement mechanisms).
169. In re Peek, 565 A.2d 627 (D.C. 1989).
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of a four-month suspension of lawyer Peek for misconduct based in large
part on his chronic depression.170 The court conditioned the stay on a twoyear probationary period during which Peek would have to receive mental
health counseling.171
Likewise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court dealt with a lawyer diagnosed
with anxiety and depression that caused his practice to suffer.172 Testimony
from a psychologist explaining the major depressive episode the lawyer
suffered would likely not return with proper control and monitoring seemed
to convince the court to temper discipline.173 Thus, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court conditioned Loew’s resumption of practice on maintaining
a therapeutic relationship with a psychiatrist for five years postreinstatement of the attorney’s practice.174 Given conceptual benefits the
courts see in aiding those lawyers already afflicted with mental health
conditions, preventative measures will only further serve the goal of
protecting the profession and clients.
Granted, an endeavor such as requiring lawyers to submit to mental
health screenings is highly aspirational in nature. It entails a great deal of
cost and organization, more than likely foisting additional responsibilities on
state bars. In the past, the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to utilize a
mental health counseling requirement for an attorney to return to practice,
reasoning the adverse effects a reported relapse would have on the lawyer’s
probation would prove detrimental; instead the court opted for voluntary
counseling.175 Still, the Oklahoma court tacitly admitted the value of
therapeutic relationships in managing the stressors and aggravating factors
on lawyers’ mental health.176 Rather than disbar an attorney for his workrelated anxiety and depression, this court saw the value in continuing to
allow him to practice while recognizing the benefits of periodically

170. Id. at 634.
171. Id.
172. See In re Loew, 780 N.W.2d 523, 527–28 (Wis. 2010) (describing attorney Loew’s mental
state and the impact of his mental state on his practice).
173. See id. at 528 (recommending a sixty-day suspension and restrictions on the attorney’s
resumption of his practice proposed by a licensed psychologist).
174. See id. at 529 (requiring semi-annual reports from the lawyer’s physiatrist regarding the
status of the lawyer’s mental health and management of symptoms).
175. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Townsend, 277 P.3d 1269, 1281 n.50 (Okla. 2012).
176. See id. at 1280–81 (crafting conditions while availing to notions acknowledging the rigors
associated with solo practice as it relates to anxiety and depression).
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monitoring the lawyer’s mental health.177
When a lawyer allows a mental health condition to go unacknowledged
and unchecked, there is a higher likelihood of severe consequences.178
Procedures in place to actively monitor the mental health of lawyers creates
the possibility of catching instances when mental health conditions go
unchecked. The lawyer, the client, and the profession arguably benefit
under this system.
With a steadily increased focus on the mental health of practicing lawyers,
bold and aspirational advances are necessary to continue to change the
negatively stereotyped culture associated with lawyer mental health
conditions. Providing lawyers with a constant update on their mental health
status will better effectuate the provisions of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) insofar
as it would inform lawyers about their current mental health status and
hopefully grant lawyers information on how to deal with mental health
conditions. The lack of definition regarding what constitutes a mental
condition under Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) leaves anxiety, depression, and
bipolar disorder within the realm of possible qualifying conditions. These
same conditions are also detectable if this mandatory scheme is adopted.
B. Making Depression, Anxiety, and Bipolar Disorder Mitigating Factors in
Disciplinary Proceedings
Another course of action the ABA and state bar associations can take is
to specifically make common mental health conditions like depression,
anxiety, and bipolar disorder mandatory mitigating factors in imposing
discipline for lawyers accused of violating Model Rule 1.16(a)(2). The
guiding principle and purpose of disciplining lawyers is not to punish the
lawyer but to protect the public; some courts, however, view the sanction as
a signal to other lawyers that such conduct is intolerable.179 However, when
courts punish lawyers already suffering mental health conditions, they are
effectively punishing the victim for a mental health condition the lawyer
177. See id. (recommending the attorney “be disciplined by public reprimand” and encouraging
the attorney continue regular meetings with a therapist). Contra In re Sherman, 404 P.2d 978, 983 (Wash.
1965) (Rosellini, C.J., dissenting) (advocating suspension of an attorney and drawing an analogy
between a lawyer practicing with the “handicap” of mental illness with a doctor suffering from palsy
practicing surgery).
178. See In re Murrow, 336 P.3d 859, 863, 866 (Kan. 2014) (noting a lawyer suffered severe
depression for years prior to its climax, which resulted in a violation of the state equivalent to Model
Rule 1.16(a)(2)).
179. Att’y. Grievance Comm’n v. Wallace, 793 A.2d 535, 542–43 (Md. 2002) (examining the
purpose underlying attorney discipline).
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never wanted. It is time to reevaluate the effectiveness of discipline in
relation to lawyer mental health.180
The difficulties involved in disciplining lawyers with mental health
conditions is brought to the fore in the pre-Model Rules case of In re
Sherman.181 Lawyer Sherman was charged with incompetently representing
clients while suffering a personality disorder that caused him to lose control
of his emotional stability.182 The majority opinion expressed reservation
regarding disbarring Sherman simply for his having such a mental health
condition, especially considering the treatable and manageable nature of the
condition.183 In lieu of disbarment or suspension, the court saw the best
course of action would be to allow the otherwise capable lawyer to continue
to practice once treatment for his condition was complete.184
Since Model Rule 1.16(a)(2), as analyzed in this Comment, is based on a
lawyer’s mental condition that materially impairs their ability to represent their
client, allowing such a mental condition to be a mitigating factor in attorney
discipline seems counterintuitive. However, in its Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions, the ABA has already proposed “mental disabilit[ies]” as a
permissive, but not a mandatory, factor in mitigating discipline.185 Crafting
these standards was an effort to promote uniformity in disciplining lawyer
misconduct; they are relied upon to some degree even though they are not
binding on state disciplinary bodies.186 Abolishing the mental health
provision of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) is unlikely considering its staying power
through the Model Rules variations, but emphasizing treatment and
rehabilitation is preferable to continued discipline.
Indeed, some states do use the presence of a mental health condition as
a mitigating factor. The Kansas Supreme Court, in In re Murrow,187 handed
180. See Page Thead Pulliam, Lawyer Depression: Taking a Closer Look at First-Time Ethics Offenders,
32 J. LEGAL PROFESSION 289, 294–95 (2008) (taking issue with the appropriateness of continuing to
use the limited means available in traditional disciplinary sanctions to treat lawyer mental health
problems).
181. In re Sherman, 404 P.2d 978 (Wash. 1965).
182. Id. at 978, 980.
183. Id. at 980–81.
184. See id. at 982 (providing for voluntary treatment for mental health conditions prior to
allowing an attorney to return to practice).
185. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER
SANCTIONS (1992).
186. See Todd Goren & Bethany Smith, Depression as a Mitigating Factor in Lawyer Discipline,
14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1081, 1085–86 (2001) (considering the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, which consider chemical dependency and mental disabilities potential mitigating factors).
187. In re Murrow, 336 P.3d 859 (Kan. 2014)
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down a one-year suspension for a lawyer found in violation of several state
equivalent Model Rule provisions, including 1.16(a)(2).188 After a diagnosis
of severe depression requiring medication, psychotherapy, and several
medical leaves of absence, lawyer Murrow missed deadlines causing
prejudicial outcomes for his clients’ cases.189 Murrow’s doctor linked the
severe depression to his law practice, yet implied, in his letter dated
January 15, 2014, Murrow could potentially successfully recover and return
to practice after a hiatus from practicing law and proper treatment.190
Instead of taking a dismissive view towards the lawyer’s mental health like
one trial court judge,191 the Kansas Supreme Court granted reinstatement
provided the lawyer “received adequate health treatment, including
psychological treatment, and has been medically and psychologically
evaluated and determined fit to engage in the active practice of law.”192
Importantly, the violation of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) was deemed a direct
result of Murrow’s suffering from depression.193 Rather than punish
Murrow for this fact, the court allowed him to return to practice, provided
he took the necessary steps to rehabilitate his mental condition. This
alternative is preferable to enforcing sanctions against lawyers already
suffering from mental health conditions.194
Using the mental health of a lawyer in mitigating a violation of Model
Rule 1.16(a)(2) should become mandatory and adapt to the current
situations facing lawyers. In many cases, state supreme courts using mental
health as a mitigating factor must consider whether there is a causal nexus
between the misconduct and mental impairment.195 The requirement
essentially prohibits considering the mental health of a lawyer in mitigation
188. See id. at 869–70 (conditioning reinstatement to active practice upon receiving treatment
for his mental health conditions).
189. See id. at 861, 863 (providing an example of a case where the lawyer missed deadlines and
providing letters from the lawyer’s physician outlining the details of the lawyer’s mental illness).
190. See id. at 863–64 (“As to [Murrow’s] potential return to the practice of law; only time will
tell.”).
191. See id. at 869 (quoting Judge Vano’s comments on the record: “[Murrow] may, in fact, have
an illness, but he also has a responsibility to his client”).
192. Id. at 870.
193. See id. at 867 (finding the lawyer’s personal and emotional problems a mitigating factor in
considering discipline for the lawyer).
194. See Pulliam, supra note 180, at 301 (arguing the use of harsh disciplinary sanctions against
depressed lawyers will deter treatment).
195. See Kristy N. Bernard & Matthew L. Gibson, Professional Misconduct by Mentally Impaired
Attorneys: Is There a Better Way to Treat an Old Problem?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619, 624 (2004)
(discussing the use of mental impairment as a factor in mitigation).
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unless the lawyer proves his mental health was a direct cause of the
misconduct.196 However, this causal requirement ignores the reality that
any lawyer suffering a mental health condition like depression, anxiety, or
bipolar disorder is continually operating under a hindrance. Whether
conscious of it or not, lawyers suffering from mental health conditions have
their daily lives colored in front of this backdrop. Consideration of this fact
informs the view that mental health should be considered a mitigating factor
in disciplining lawyers for violating Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) regardless of
proof of a causal connection.
As at least one commenter has posited, completely removing a lawyer
with a treatable mental condition from the legal practice seems to serve
neither the public nor the practice.197 Amending the Model Rules to
include a minimum amount of psychiatric therapy sessions ensures lawyers
keep the ever-present stress associated with the legal profession from
manifesting into full-blown anxiety or depression. Like the minimum hour
requirements aimed at maintaining competency among legal professionals,
a requirement ensuring a lawyer maintain his or her mental health will serve
to protect clients from the repercussions of having a lawyer practicing with
a mental health condition materially impairing the lawyer’s ability.
Further, easing the disciplinary burdens imposed by Model
Rule 1.16(a)(2) will hopefully shift the focus from disciplining lawyers for
their mental health conditions to encouraging rehabilitation and treatment.
Concomitantly, these two recommendations will serve to alleviate the
burden on lawyers having to deal with the unworkable situation Model
Rule 1.16(a)(2) presents.
V. CONCLUSION
The guiding light of the legal profession is—and rightfully should be—
lawyers acting in the best interests of their clients to effectuate their clients’
legal goals. However, as the understanding of mental health conditions like
anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder increases, the legal profession must
continue to address the outsized instances of these mental health conditions.
The mandatory duty to withdraw or forgo representation when a lawyer

196. See In re Kurtz, 580 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (declining to use a lawyer’s
personal health problems in mitigation absent a showing of a causal nexus between the misconduct
and the health condition); Fla. Bar v. Clement, 662 So. 2d 690, 699–700 (Fla. 1995) (refusing to
acknowledge a lawyer’s bipolar disorder as a factor in mitigation).
197. Bernard & Gibson, supra note 195, at 627–28.
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suffers a mental health condition is twice enforced against lawyers—once in
the state-adopted versions of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and again in the
precedents set in state supreme court decisions, as they serve as the ultimate
arbitrators of attorney discipline in their jurisdictions.
With the increase of Lawyer Assistance Programs providing lawyers with
the tools to protect themselves and their clients from the crippling effects
of these diseases, lawyers have unclear and often unworkable duties under
the Model Rules. If the legal profession is earnest in its desire to combat
mental illness, certain changes must occur in how lawyers with mental health
issues are treated.
Rather than punish lawyers laboring within the ill-defined standards
under the Model Rules, disciplinary bodies should increase deference to
lawyers suffering these mental health conditions that often arise from
practicing law. Additionally, the ABA should consider amending the Model
Rules to include a mandatory provision for lawyers to receive mental health
treatment before continuing to practice law. Not only will a change
requiring lawyers to receive periodic checkups on their mental health save
lawyers from harming their client’s interests, it will also improve the
functioning of the Model Rules as lawyers can more actively understand
their situation rather than leave the issues to fester.
Bold changes like these at the level of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct are the best course of action. Due to the Model Rules’
influential nature to spark uniform change throughout the states, changing
the Model Rules presents a preferable alternative to piecemeal adoption at
the state level. The amount of latitude vested in state courts to interpret the
ambiguous nature of Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) is a concept difficult to contend
with if, indeed, a nationally uniform system of professional conduct is
preferable.
With stare decisis binding state supreme courts to antiquated notions of
mental health, increased sympathy and a more robust understanding of
mental health conditions today must grapple with these past sentiments.
The pattern of accepting mental health conditions as legitimate when
explained by underlying physical difficulties is evidence of the possible
shortcomings of waiting for courts and the ABA to slowly overturn
precedent. Some progress is preferable to none, but this problem is worthy
of a nudge in the right direction.
To date, lawyers’ primary professional duties towards clients have taken
precedence even when balanced against lawyers’ physiological and
psychological health. If the legal profession is serious in its desire to treat
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the wide-reaching mental illnesses in the legal profession without shutting
out a large proportion of current and aspiring practitioners, it is time to shift
the calculus slightly in favor of lawyers. Changing the terms by which
lawyers navigate their professional duties under Model Rule 1.16(a)(2) and
its precedent are potential starting points.

